Why the United States Lost the Vietnam War?

The Vietnam War was a war fought on many fronts. America failed to comprehend a strategy that took into consideration the wider context of the war and therefore was drawn into a bloody stalemate and eventual defeat. By assessing a number of these fronts it is possible to argue that America contextualized the war within a limited framework and how its single emphasis on military victory lacked the necessary ability to win the wider war. By considering how it used conventional warfare within a jungle environment, how it failed to consider the nationalist impulse of Hanoi, its dismissal of the importance of the village war, its support of a unpopular government, and by its inability to consolidate opposition at home and control the media, one can note that Washington was unable to reach victory and eventually had to concede to a compromise. Therefore, it is not possible to blame one distinct factor in composing an American defeat. By an eclectic amalgam of misconceptions and ignorance within American policymaking towards each of these factors America fell far short of victory.

In the aftermath of World War II the United States emerged as the great superpower of the world and adopted the role as the world’s policeman. By 1961 the world was split between East and West. McCarthyism during the 1950s had exasperated a ‘Red Scare’ across America with the universe coming to the verge of nuclear annihilation with the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was the age of John F. Kennedy, who set the atmosphere with his inaugural address declaring, ‘ask not what your country can do for; ask what you can do for your country.’ Having faced humiliation at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy sought to reassert America’s credibility across the international spectrum. Kennedy affirmed the domino theory of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia in 1956 before congress proclaiming:

[Vietnam] represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the red tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam.

Suffering from a Cold War mentality, and the government attempting to avoid being tarnished as soft on communism, American intervention in Vietnam was rationalized within Cold War politics. As military personnel traveled 10,000 miles across the globe they entered a conflict in which they failed to understand the enemy’s cause. Jack S. Swender, a lance corporal, explained the reason he was fighting in Vietnam:

Some people wonder why Americans are in Vietnam. The way I see the situation, I would rather fight to stop communism in South Vietnam than in Kincaid, Humbolt, Blue Mound, or Kansas City, and that is just about what it would end up being.

As America used Cold War politics to justify its intervention in Southeast Asia, it failed to understand the complexity of the Vietnamese people. For the past twenty-five years the Vietnamese had fought against foreign control by the Chinese, Japanese and the French. Having received their independence from French colonial rule and with the desire to setup an independent nation was confronted now with America seeking to impose its Cold War politics on the country. Therefore for Hanoi, the war was just a continuation of a nationalist revolution. Diem Chau, the editor of Trinh Bay magazine, depicted the Vietnamese opinion when he claimed, ‘this war is a war against the American imperialist. This is our war for independence.’ As Fitzgerald argues:

By intervening in the Vietnamese struggle the United States was attempting to fit its global strategies into a world of hillocks and hamlets, to reduce its majestic concerns for the containment of communism and the security of the Free World to a dimension where governments rose and fell as a result of arguments between colonels’ wives.

America was so determined to contain Communism, that it was even willing to support an unstable and corrupt government in Vietnam. The inability of the Saigon government to consolidate the support of the masses would prove to be a crucial factor in undermining America’s legitimacy to fight the war. In my personal correspondence with Chuck Peabody, a U.S. platoon leader serving in Vietnam between November 1968 and 1969, he wrote:

After WWII the US was paranoid about the spread of communism. It dominated their foreign policy to the point of the U.S. government assisting any third world dictator as long as he was not a “Red.” It didn’t matter how brutal or corrupt he was if [he] pledged to fight Communism.

Ngo Dinh Diem became the country’s first premier. Diem ran a corrupt and despotic regime. He established a nepotistic government, appointing family members to office. Diem’s brother, Nhu, became head of a secret terrorist police force, while his other brother Thuc was appointed the Catholic Archbishop of Hue. Diem’s dictatorship increasingly isolated the masses with Buddhists, who composed eighty percent of the population, suffering under Diem’s stringent Catholicism. Catholics often received favoured treatment, for example under Diem most provincial chiefs were Catholic. Moreover, he displaced peasants of their land by returning the elite landlords to control of the countryside. By 1961, the Saigon government lacked control of between eighty and ninety percent of the rural populace. As resentment fueled toward Diem and his family, a crisis exploded onto the streets of Hue on May 8, 1963, when Buddhist monks revolted against religious persecution. Protests spread, with a Buddhist monk immolating himself in Saigon on June 11. As shocking images of Thich Quang Duc in flames spread across the world, public opinion turned against American involvement. Furthermore, students, unions and even the military took to the streets. In November 1963, Diem became the victim of a political coup in which he and his brothers were assassinated. In 1964 there had been seven different governments established in South Vietnam, each corrupt and unpopular. The government of Saigon only remained in power due to the support of America. The majority of the population perceived it to be a puppet of the American imperialists. The government’s unpopularity played into the hands of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and Hanoi. NLF insurgents exploited the government’s weakness by winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the villagers appealing to their national impulse and providing opportunities for land, healthcare, sanitary, and educational reform. The backing of a corrupt and unpopular regime would be a crucial factor in America’s inability to win and pacify the people. The sponsorship of an unpopular regime only helped fuel anti-American sentiment. As Hughes-Wilson claims, ‘South Vietnam’s rotten, confused and corrupt regime was America’s fundamental strategic weakness in Indochina.’

In the mid-20th century America was the most technologically and economically advanced nation across the globe. Its universal prestige became the driving force of America’s escalation into Vietnam. When President Lyndon Baines Johnson reaffirmed America’s interests in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the driving assumption of American intervention was that she could fight a ‘limited war’ with a quick victory. Washington believed that the most advanced nation on earth could flex its military power to subdue Hanoi into a settlement on American terms. One journalist illustrated this view when on a visit to an aircraft carrier on the coast of Vietnam in 1965 he was reported to have said, ‘they just ought to show this ship to the Vietcong – that would make them give up.’ On February 13, 1965, Johnson authorized Operation ROLLING THUNDER. The rationale behind the operative was that by systematically bombing North Vietnam, Hanoi would be pushed over the ‘threshold of pain’ to the conference table. In 1965, the US Air Force flew some 55,000 sorties dropping 33,000 tons of bombs; by 1967 a huge fleet of B-52 bombers dropped 247,140 tonnage of explosives. Johnson had limited bombing to military targets and infiltration lines in 1965. By 1968 aerial targets expanded to petroleum depots and transportation networks. By the end of ROLLING THUNDER the US had dropped more bombs than in all the theaters of World War II. However, despite American efforts, Hanoi could not be bombed to the conference table. Between 1965 and 1968 around 500,000 Vietcong and NLF forces infiltrated the South. Furthermore, the aerial campaign had proved financially draining costing in 1966, $9.60 for every $1 worth of damage. The US from 1965 to 1968 lost 950 airplanes costing approximately $6 billion. Americans underestimate the resolve of what they saw as an agrarian backward nation. As Ruane highlights:

… ‘Rolling Thunder’ appears to have drawn an already regimented and tight-knit society even closer together and helped rather than hindered Hanoi’s efforts to mobilize the population in defence of themselves and their country. If American strategists had bothered to study Vietnamese history, such resilience in the face of an external threat might have been predicted. For more than a thousand years the Vietnamese had struggled to remain independent of a powerful China to the north, and a similar determination was evident in their more recent efforts to withstand the French and even the People’s Republic of China.

Moreover, as Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara later remorsefully noted to Newsweek in 1966:

[I] never thought it would go like this. I didn’t think these people had the capacity to fight this way. If I had thought they would take this punishment and fight this well, and could enjoy fighting like this, I would have thought differently at the start…

In 1965 President Johnson authorized the Americanization of the conflict. In March Johnson assigned two battalions of the Marine Corps into the South and by the end of the year the total deployment of US troops reached 184,300. As more and more troops were enlisted into South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland proposed a strategy of attrition. The aim was to disable the North Vietnamese insurgents quicker than they could be replaced. As one of Westmoreland’s advisors surmised it, ‘the solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm… till the other side cracks and gives up.’ Attrition was based on the ideals of conventional warfare. Military strategists assumed that American forces could take the initiative and fight a war similar to that of World War II. However, Vietnam was fought without frontlines. The policy of attrition lacked the strategic understanding of guerrilla warfare. Through tunnel networks and their access to Cambodia and Laos, the Vietcong were able to determine the place, time and circumstances in which combat would be initiated. The North Vietnamese insurgents and Vietcong launched ninety percent of all land conflicts. The grunts found it impossible to distinguish between the enemy and the civilians, making US troops vulnerable to surprise attack. Attrition relied heavily on the body count to determine the scale of American victory. However, military officers under pressure to produce positive attrition rates among the enemy were notorious for exaggerating body counts. In certain instances the body count was exaggerated by 100 percent. Therefore, when results reached Washington it provided a flawed representation of the war. Attrition failed to undermine the North Vietnamese military strength with some 200,000 North Vietnamese males reaching draft age per year. In 1968 the North could boast of a total manpower of 2.3 million. One Commander noted, ‘the policy was attrition – killing VC – this offered no solution – it was senseless.’ As Record argues, ‘Westmoreland’s administrative practices succeeded in “attriting” U.S. forces more effectively than his attrition strategy did the PAVN and the VC.’

While extensive emphasis was placed on military strategy in winning the war, little effort was placed on fighting what would be termed the ‘other war.’ The village war was left to the backburner of US policy. As Westmoreland placed an importance on search-and-destroy operatives, after areas had been secured from Vietcong control, little effort was placed on permanent pacification. As soon as US troops left the region, Vietcong forces would move back in. Westmoreland failed to consider the impact his campaign of attrition had on the lives of the Vietnamese. Regions became free-fire zones, ancestral homes were burned, and livestock and civilians were subject to target practice. In 1971 an estimated 900,000 civilians were wounded and around 400,000 dead in the fighting campaign in the South. In sweeps across villages and hamlets, homes were destroyed Military operations resulted in the involuntary uprooting of some fifty percent of the population from the countryside into the cities. Refugees accounted for five million people in a country whose population was 17 million. American ground conflicts were severely detrimental to the livelihood of the Vietnamese. Chemical defoliants such as Agent Orange were sprayed on crops and vegetation, having a long-term impact on the health of the people. A country renowned for its rice exports in 1967 had to import 750,000 tons of rice. Americans showed little value to the lives of those they were supposedly there to protect. One of the most infamous cases was the My Lai massacre. On March 16, 1968, Company C of Task Force Barker carried out a search-and-destroy mission in the Hamlet of My Lai, which was believed to be a Vietcong stronghold. No enemy was ever encountered during the attack with some 175 to 200 villagers killed with a number of rape killings. Civilians were shot without discrimination including women, children and elderly men. Furthermore, this was not an isolated event, between January 1965 and March 1973 201 soldiers were court-martialed for crimes against the Vietnamese. Consequently, the military’s ignorance toward the ‘village war’ helped bolster support for the NLF, and strengthened Vietnamese opposition to the American invasion. As Record argues:

Photographs of terrified children fleeing napalm strikes and statements by American officers in the field that this or that hamlet or town had to be destroyed in order to “save it” played directly into the hands of communist propagandists, who throughout the war appreciated public opinion as the key factor in the war’s outcome.

Attempts to pacify support for Saigon were limited. The Army showed little interest in pacification. However, the Marine Corps did make a serious effort in securing the rural villages and hamlets. The Marines formed Combined Action Platoons (CAPS), which consisted of fifteen marines and thirty-four Vietnamese troops to work alongside the villagers and building intelligence networks. While the Marines’ efforts were successful in the areas in which they were stationed, such cases were few and far between. In 1968, around $14 billion was used on attrition operations compared to only $850 million on pacification programs. As Ruane notes, ‘…the failure to win South Vietnamese ‘hearts and minds’ would prove to be one of the main reasons why such a military victory never materialized.’ Hess supports this statement, as he claims:

Only by concentrating its resources on pacification could the US have won the support of the peasantry and with them, the ideological battle against the Communists. The Americans had the manpower, knowledge, and experience necessary to engage the NLF/VC in the battle of ideas but instead the US squandered its resources on an essentially mindless and counter-productive war of attrition. In sum, American strategy failed to recognize that “hearts and minds” were more important than a “body count.”

As Johnson escalated American involvement in Southeast Asia, a war of opposition was escalating on the streets at home. In 1965 students and faculty at the University of Michigan organized a “teach-in” demonstration. Consequently “teach-ins” spread across campuses with the largest taking place at the University of California, Berkeley, were an estimated 30,000 participated in the event which lasted thirty-six hours in May 1965. By October 1965 the nation had witnessed over sixty protests with some 100,000 people involved. In April 1967 more than 300,000 Americans demonstrated in New York in the largest protest in American history to that point. Simultaneously around 60,000 demonstrators marched in San Francisco with 170 expressing their dissent by burning their draft cards. During October 21 and 22, 1967, the nation’s capital was invaded by antiwar advocates chanting, ‘hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today?’ and carrying placards stating ‘LBJ pull out like your father should have done.’ While many did not take to the streets, the mobilization of activists did have a profound impact on policymakers in Washington. Sons and daughters of government officials including McNamara, Nicholas Katzenbach, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk openly disapproved of their fathers’ policies, which caused many of the ‘warmongers’ to reassess their views on the war. Herring claims, ‘…the nation appeared on the verge of an internal crisis as severe as the Great Depression of the 1930s.’ Consequently, Zinn argues, ‘the United States lost the war in both the Mekong Valley and the Mississippi Valley.’

In an effort to consolidate doubts of the war effort, President Johnson embarked on a public relations campaign. As part of the PR crusade, General Westmoreland was called back to the U.S. in November 1967. In his infamous speech to the National Press Club he purported, ‘We have reached an important point where the end begins to come in view’ and promised of ‘some light at the end of the tunnel.’ Such acclamations were supported by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who after returning from a diplomatic trip to Saigon, told reporters, ‘we are beginning to win this struggle. We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained. We are making steady progress.’ Furthermore, General Bruce Palmer announced, ‘the war – the military war – in Vietnam is nearly won. The Vietcong has been defeated from Danang all the way down in the populated areas. He can’t get food and he can’t recruit.’ With such optimistic reportage from the government, the American public was deceived into thinking the war was almost won. However, while Washington went on the PR offensive, Hanoi was preparing its own general offensive. On January 30, 1968, on the Lunar New Year, an estimated 84,000 NLF and North Vietnamese troops launched a mass attack on the urban centres of the South. The Communist forces attacked five of the six largest cities, thirty-six out of forty-four provincial capitals, and sixty-four of 242 district capitals. Militarily the Tet Offensive was a disaster for Hanoi. The civilian uprising, which it anticipated, never fermented. Moreover, the North’s army was disabled with heavy losses, with some 40,000 dead compared to the Americans 1,100. Within three weeks Saigon was regained and while the battle over Hue lasted a month, Hanoi did not gain any new territory. However, Tet proved a political and psychological defeat for America. The idea that the war was almost over was shattered. As Moss notes:

…news of the Tet coup de main broke like a thunderclap across America. The fact that the enemy could mount a major military effect all over South Vietnam and catch the allies by surprise shattered all illusions of impending American victory in the war.

As images galvanized across the television screens into the homes of millions of Americans of cities under siege and the U.S. Embassy, being overtaken, horrified viewers perceived an enemy victory. Tom Engelhardt recalled, ‘it was like Vietnam had somehow come all the way into our living rooms.’ Americans witnessed on the screen the execution of a handcuffed Vietcong prisoner who was shot by South Vietnamese General Nguyen Ngoc Loan. The media that had been generally supportive of the war, after this major offensive began to question officials’ statements. It is said that when Walter Cronkite reported that the war had turned into a ‘bloody stalemate’, Lyndon Johnson commented to his advisors ‘it’s all over.’ Johnson had been conscious of the impact of the media and even had three televisions placed in the Oval office. It was an uncensored war and at its peak there were 500 reporters in the country. Night after night Americans were subject to the true brutality of war. President Johnson in his memoirs claims that sensational reportage of Tet played a crucial role in turning the offensive into a defeat at home. As he recalled:

There was a great deal of emotional and exaggerated reporting of the Tet offensive in our press and on television. The media seemed to be in competition as to who could provide the most lurid and depressing accounts… The American people and even a number of officials in government, subjected to this daily barrage of bleakness and near panic, began to think that we must have suffered a defeat.

Tet had a profound impact on American public opinion. A Gallup poll indicated that in November 1967 fifty percent of those surveyed believed the war was making progress, following Tet this fell to thirty-three percent. As Allen argues:

Tet was the turning point in the American war in Vietnam. It had a dramatic effect on domestic U.S. politics. From Tet on the question was no longer when would the United States win the war, but how quickly could the United States get out of Vietnam.

As the conflict was becoming profoundly unpopular at home, the morale of the grunts in the far-off jungles rapidly declined. For commanding officers the war was a tool for promotion. Through a rotation scheme young inexperienced officers could expand their career with a six months or less tour of duty, while the grunts served the full year. As a result combat troops held their superiors with contempt and dissension within the ranks grew. As Bruce Lawlor, a CIA case officer claimed:

The only thing the officers wanted to do was get their six months in command then split back to the States and be promoted and on to bigger and better things. It doesn’t take long for the average guy out in the field to say, “Fuck it!”

The number of ‘fraggings’ ascended with officers constituting the brunt of the victims. Between 1969 and 1971 it was reported that there were 730 incidents of ‘fragging.’ As one soldier put it, ‘I was more at war with the officers there than I was with the Viet Cong.’ Grunts resisted authority by refusing to obey commands and vandalizing military property. They painted ‘UUUU’ on their helmets, an acronym for ‘the unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary, for the ungrateful.’ The army’s recruitment slogan ‘Fun Travel Adventure’ became ‘Fuck the Army.’ Drug abuse was rampant with an estimated 65,000 U.S. soldiers using drugs. Such opposition to the war from those who were fighting it did have a detrimental effect on Washington and the outcome of the conflict. As Allen argues:

The United States entered the war in Vietnam with the most powerful military in the world but within a few years this very same military was in a state of disarray, disintegration, and rebellion. This GI rebellion progressively undermined the ability of the United States to defeat the NLF and the North Vietnamese, and was an important factor in Nixon’s decision to draw down troop levels and eventually pull the troops out completely.

Richard M. Nixon was driven by the same misconception of American exceptionalism. He continued a policy of attrition and was determined to not to be the first U.S. president to lose a war. Expanding the conflict, in 1971 alone, more bombs were dropped than in World War II. In the first three years of Nixon’s presidency Americans lost 15,000 servicemen and the South Vietnamese suffered losses of 107,504 between 1969 and 1973. As Americans became demoralized over the war, the antiwar movement became more pronounced with “moratoriums” in Washington announcing the names of the American dead. College campuses came to a standstill with mass waves of protest. Nixon had to concede to a policy of ‘Vietnamization.’ In June 1969 Nixon announced the beginning of a gradual withdrawal of 25,000 troops. Under Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese forces were mobilized with mass supplies and training by the Americans. Thieu ordered the induction of men aged between eighteen and thirty-eight into the military, and by the conclusion of 1970 the South Vietnamese were some 1,100,000 strong. The U.S. supplied the Vietnamese with over a million M-16 rifles and 12,000 M-60 machine guns. Under Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese became one of the strongest military forces in the world. Despite Nixon’s efforts, Vietnamization was cynically perceived as a cover-up for U.S. abandonment. The South Vietnamese, having been arrogantly neglected within the war, failed to show the same determination as Hanoi. Desertion rates remained high and ‘flower soldiers’ paid their commanding officers to avoid combat. While, America was withdrawing its troops, the NLF was still going to be there when the Americans left. Finally, in 1973 a peace agreement was signed, however by 1975 a North Vietnamese flag would be flying over Saigon.

In evaluation, America lost the Vietnam War because of a failure to understand the complexity, the wider context and underlying issues that the war represented. America sought to fit neatly its Cold War policies into a country that for 2,000 years that had opposed foreign intervention and had strong nationalist tendencies. By backing a corrupt and unpopular government it lacked legitimacy to carrying out its goals and feeble attempts at pacification caused it to fight an American war that lacked the mandate of the people of Vietnam. It arrogantly believed that it could fight the conflict through military strength alone and undermined the resolve of what it perceived as an agrarian and backward enemy. As America deployed more and more troops, the U.S. became drawn into a stalemate and with no end in sight and as more grunts returned home in wooden boxes, Americans began to question rationale behind the ‘necessary war.’ A wave of opposition occurred on the home front, which politicians had never experienced before, and with the advent of television and as the media became increasingly cynical of the war effort, Washington found itself largely restricted in its policymaking. The nation had become conscious of the governments deception after Tet and morale among the GIs became exasperated. Dissension was rampant among the grunts and efforts to mobilize a largely displaced Vietnamese force were limited in results. America failed to adopt an effective strategy in the implementation of the war and consequently had to concede to defeat. The loss of Vietnam could probably be aptly evaluated by Omar Bradley’s description of the proposed expansion of the Korean conflict into China when he stated, ‘[it was] the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.’

A New Deal: Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1st Inauguration

The inauguration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the thirty-second president of the United States represents one of the greatest turning points in the Depression era of the 1930s. Through allowing the depression to culminate during the final months of Hoovers administration the nation, in a pinnacle state of despondency, looked towards Roosevelt for a new reinvigorating leadership. His discourse during the address through his decisive mannerism, religious connotations and in the active vibrancy of his wording all helped in the reconstruction of national confidence. The world responded warmly to his words of hope and action, and his appeal engaged the support of both Democrats and Republicans.

As a result with the peoples army behind him he was able to commence his conquest to defeat the economic foe. Despite the conciseness of the address, especially during the recent economic recession, it remains one of the most renowned speeches within history.

When on March 4, 1933 Roosevelt took the oath of office as President of the United States the nation was in the midst of an economic disaster. On the brink of the inauguration day America was experiencing it’s fourth winter of depression. The week prior to Roosevelt taking up the presidency Europeans withdrew almost $1 billion in gold reserve from New York City banks. Furthermore, state governors declared a de facto bank holiday to be implemented. On March 4 over five thousand banks were closed which included all banks in New York and Illinois. Almost a quarter of the national workforce was unemployed. On the verge of FDR being sworn in as president, America’s economy was on the brink of collapse. The very ideals of the American dream, that if one works hard he can live a happy and prosperous life, were shaken from their very foundations. As Heale surmised, ‘When Franklin Roosevelt was sworn in on 4 March 1933 the economic crisis was at its most terrifying.’ In light of such an economic background the hope and confidence of the nation was deflated into a pit of despair. As a result FDR was likened as onto a physician, the New York Times highlighted on the eve of his inauguration ‘he will be thought of as something of a miracle-worker.’

During the interregnum, November 1932 – March 1933, Roosevelt refused to associate himself with the Hoover administration. In the final months of his presidency Hoover attempted to enroll FDR’s help in producing a solution to the worsening crisis by pleading him to cooperate in a commission to discuss foreign economic affairs such as the war debts. Further, FDR ignored invitations to be involved in the London Economic Conference in spring 1933. Even on the very eve of FDR’s inauguration Hoover presented a final effort in order to get the President-elect to regulate international financial trade. Conkin argues that FDR allowed the situation to worsen over the final months of Hoover’s administration in order to climax the image of Roosevelt as the carrier of the hopes of millions of Americans.

Conkin: The setting of the inauguration in 1933 was perfect for a hero. Depression, a bank panic, fear, the darkness could not deepen. No dramatist could have plotted a more desolate and appropriate scene for a hero’s entry… Everyone was willing to give Roosevelt an opportunity to work his magic.

FDR characterized a new social order. No where less was this seen when on inauguration day when Hoover and Roosevelt shared the traditional car journey to the capitol building Hoover depicted a somber mood in contrast to FDR’s usual warm public charm as he waved his top hat to the crowds.

The New Yorker as its front cover piece on March 4, 1933 published a cartoon portraying the scene of a melancholy Hoover in contrast to the President-elects attractive exuberance. The nation was unified in its anticipation for the new president entering office. The New York Times reported the greetings during the motorcade ‘appeared to be a note of jubilation that the day had come when the new philosophy was to replace the rejected theories of the old.’

Polenberg notes FDR’s first inaugural address was his most famous speech ‘not because it proposed concrete ways to combat the Depression but rather because it instilled new hope in the people.’ In his speech to the world Roosevelt characterized the epitome of true leadership. Hagerty of the New York Times notes:

Gone was the famous Roosevelt smile, which won him many thousands of votes when displayed during his campaign speeches. Not once during the delivery of his speech did the New President smile. Every sentence was spoken simply, but all through his address ran the note of the speaker’s conviction that the people of the United States had elected him as their leader and that they expected him to lead.

The people wanted a leader. Their hope and confidence in themselves and in their country was displaced. In his address FDR spoke affirmatively as a strong character that was able and willing to lead the nation out of economic stagnation. Eleanor Roosevelt said of the atmosphere of the inauguration, “it was very, very solemn, and a little terrifying… The crowds were so tremendous, and you felt that they would do anything – if only someone would tell them what to do.”

The rhetoric of the President’s speech had a major impact on the country. The new president spoke in a sure and definitive manner, arguing that the Depression not only could be, but would be conquered as he stated ‘this great Nation will endure as it has endured, will revive and will prosper.’ He dismantled the fears of America in his cry ‘the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.’ The psychological impact of such statements revived confidence in the nation. Actress Lillian Gish recalled during the inauguration FDR seemed “to have been dipped in phosphorous.” Walter Gifford, president of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, was reported to have stated in the New York Times:

Under his leadership, with the will to win and the willingness of each individual to make necessary sacrifices for the common good, we can and we will conquer our economic difficulties.

FDR used religious connotations in rallying the people. He stated ‘the moneychangers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths’, with reference to Jesus rebuking those who had turned the temple into a gambling den. Further he called on the need for ‘putting our own national house in order.’ Such biblical references reinforced his image of leadership as he adopted the words of the Almighty. Written correspondence to the new president portrayed the religious impact his inauguration had on the national conscience. He was perceived by the American public as having not been the mere choice of an electoral college but was essentially divinely ordained for the presidency. Mrs. William Showalter wrote to FDR, “I am quite sure it was not a mere bit of chance that brought you to the office you now hold. I truly believe you have been sent directly by god to our nation, for such a time as this.”

Another Percy Viosca of New Orleans claimed:

I felt as though at this critical period of our Nation’s existence our God, as he had done before, had sent at the exact time, a man who possessed the prudence of a Washington, the intelligence of a Jefferson, the wisdom of a Lincoln.

FDR’s inauguration was more than an address it was a declaration of war on the Depression. He argued that in the creation of employment we must treat ‘the task as we would treat the emergency of a war’ and claimed ‘that if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline.’ Further he noted, ‘I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to the disciplined attack upon our common problems.’ FDR stated he would work within the confines of the constitution but if that failed he would by no means be reluctant to call on Congress ‘for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis – broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.’ One political cartoon sketched out FDR going towards ‘the battle line of the Depression.’ The New York Times in its description stated, ‘the inaugural address was a Jacksonian speech, a fighting speech.’

The President called for a transformation of a stationary government as he stated ‘we must act and act quickly’ and ‘this nation asks for action and action now.’ The NY Times noted, ‘“Action” was the promise of Mr. Roosevelt’s speech, and action was immediately forthcoming.’ During the speech stillness swept across the audience, as people tried not to miss a single word the President had to say. However, when he stated ‘our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem’ the crowds applauded with joy.

The inauguration produced overall consensus throughout the nation. FDR was the instrument of national solidarity in 1933. Political cartoons following the inauguration depicted the President having the full resolved support of the American public. One image showed the President taking the oath while ‘John Citizen’ looks up stating ‘I pledge my faith in Franklin and my confidence in America.’ Another shows a man representing ‘The American People’ stating to FDR ‘every last one of us wishes you well – All of us want to help out in every possible way.’ One Sarah Love after witnessing the address stated to a stranger, “Any man who can talk like that in times like these is worthy of every ounce of support a true American has.” The North Carolinian responded, “I didn’t vote for him, but he’s my man, and any man who won’t back him now isn’t worthy of the name of an American.” The Los Angeles Times estimated that 400,000 people in addition to the 100,000 turnout around the inaugural platform congregated to welcome the thirty-second President despite the economic climate. The New York Times reported at the Capitol:

… The grass was hidden by a solid mass of men and women. Trees had men clinging to their branches, and the white rooftops of the chaste office building, which flanks the Capitol, were black with winter overcoats.

Americans from all four corners of the nation either watched or listened via the radio through one of the 178 American radio stations covering the President’s induction. During the week following FDR’s inauguration 460,000 letters and telegrams reached the White House depicting their support for the new President. Hoover had employed one person in the White House mailroom FDR required fifty staff. Not only did he have the fully-fledged support of the public, his inauguration heralded the unity of both Democrats and Republicans. The Republican Party prior to the inauguration also stated their overt support for New Deal initiatives in congress. The Los Angeles Times, a Republican newspaper, stated:

It was not the North, the South, the East or the West, which made him President; not the bankers, or the manufacturers, the importers, the exporters, the farmers or the wage earners. And most emphatically not the politicians. His victory was so overwhelming that he must have been supported almost equally by all classes and all kinds of people; his support had the widest geographical distribution and broke party lines in all directions.

The inauguration also presented an international importance. The Depression in 1933 was not only an American problem but was a universal disaster. FDR’s address was not just to the nation but was transmitted over the airwaves throughout the world. As the New York Times wrote:

England, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia are a few of the countries which have notified American radio headquarters of arrangements made to pick up the ceremonies… The set-up will be one of the most elaborate ever attempted for any event.

France was a major player within the gold standard and therefore held a great interest into the newly elected President’s policies and actions. As the Le Journal des Debats wrote, ‘the world waits not without anguish for his forthcoming actions.’ Further, in Britain all eyes were on Washington on March 4 as they welcomed his demands for action. The New York Times wrote of the media in Britain, ‘all published editorials are demanding exactly the kind of bold, fighting leadership which the address foreshadowed.’ While in Stuttgart, Germany a statement was transmitted noting “Roosevelt marvelous reception. Every word clearly understood. Forceful voice most impressive. Applause when national anthem was heard.”

In the 21st century as the world has witnessed an economic downturn, the speech of 1933 has been referred to as having present day political significance.

The media were keen in the election and inauguration of the forty-fourth President to emphasize the analogy between that of FDR and Barack Obama. Obama campaigned on the plaintiffs of ‘hope’ and restoring the confidence between Washington and the American public. Obama spoke with the Rooseveltian style definitive mannerism as he pronounced ‘yes we can.’ As The Guardian’s analysis of Obama’s inaugural address noted:

In an echo of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s first inaugural, Obama said it was not the nation that had failed. The crisis was a consequence of failure of leadership, and the “greed and irresponsibility” of a few. The answer was to get back to work, with the government in the lead. It was a 21st Century version of the FDR’s New Deal…

In evaluation, the inauguration symbolized a ‘New Deal’ for Americans. The Depression was at its pinnacle premises on March 4, 1933. With the American spirit in a state of despondency the nation in unison turned towards Roosevelt as their last hope of recovery. The President represented a clean slate having not been tarnished with old administration and as newspaper articles indicated his admittance to office brought a new philosophy. FDR was able to rally the support of the country. Through the use of religious connotations he was perceived as having been divinely ordained into office and carried with him the voice of a prophet sent from the eternal. The address had turned a government of inertia into an active warrior ready to overthrow the wiles of an economic disaster. As a result the inaugural declaration in only 1,929 words became the answer of the prayers of the world, and war was officially sounded on the depression.

John Foster Dulles: Effective Secretary of State?

Introduction:

John Foster Dulles during his tenure as Secretary of State from 1953 – 1959 brought with him the experience and ability of an effective diplomat within foreign affairs. He was the grandson and nephew of two former secretaries of state. However, his intellect was often undermined by his own personality and in many ways he was a victim of the time. By considering a number of his foreign policy decisions such as Geneva, Korea, the formation of a European Defense unit, and the Suez Canal Crisis it is evident he clearly lived up to the mark that the New York Times knighted him with as a ‘great negotiator.’ However, unfortunately for Dulles his personality defects of a Presbyterian background, his inability to comprehend a new post-Stalin world order, his regular speeches and press conferences and lack of understanding for the consequences of his actions tarnished his credibility and consequently has undermined his legacy.

Stalin’s Death: the Prospect of Détente?

Weeks after President Eisenhower took the oath of office he faced his first major challenge within the international arena. On March 4, 1953 Joseph Stalin died and with it brought the appearance of a new Soviet leadership. Georgi Malenkov called on the Western world for a new order of “peaceful co-existence and competition.” The question was open whether an opportunity had arisen to defrost Cold War tensions. Winston Churchill welcomed the idea of relaxing tensions and called for a summit between the world powers. On April 16, 1953 Eisenhower went before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and made his renowned ‘Chance for Peace Speech.’ Isaacs and Downing claim ‘he appeared to be holding out an olive branch hoping the Kremlin would grab it.’ Two days later Foster Dulles went before the same audience of editors arguing “we are not dancing to any Russian tune.” As a result Leffler notes ‘Dulles’s address seemed belligerent and insulting, and had wrongly stated the Soviet leaders were responding to U.S. strength.’ Gardner surmised, ‘if Eisenhower’s language opened the road to negotiations (an arguable proposition), Dulles put a gate across the path two days later.’

Dulles claimed that the Soviet Union could not be trusted and that “vast power is possessed by men who accept no guidance from the moral law.” The secretary of state was uncompromising in his rhetoric to what perhaps could have been a prospect of peace. Kirby notes:

Dulles behaved as though the Cold War was a morality play in which he was acting the part of an old style preacher. He insisted the Soviet Union was an evil and an untrustworthy nation with which America and its allies should have no dealings.

Hoopes in consensus argues that for the new secretary the world was in a spiritual war on one side of the battlefield lay Christianity and the other Communism. This overall belief dictated his actions within foreign policy and further strained his relationship with his international counterparts. As Goold-Adams surmised, ‘Dulles had thought so much about Communism before coming to power that inevitably he did not find it easy to change his main conclusions after Stalin died.’ As a result his stringent ideals defected his effectiveness as a Secretary of State in a Post-Stalin era.

Korean Armistice:

Concluding the Korean conflict became an imperative objective of the new administration. Korea had become a financial burden on United States defense. In the last three years of the Truman administration defense spending escalated from $13.5 billion to over $50 billion. It therefore became a key aim to conclude the war, however negotiations came to a halt each time over the conditions to which POWs should be repatriated. Eisenhower decided to play on the threat of nuclear defense if the Chinese would not concede over the terms for an armistice. The conflict would expand to Mainland China and include the use of nuclear weaponry unless China accepted the proposals. Dulles took advantage of a diplomatic trip to India to meet with Prime Minister Nehru. Dulles mentioned to the PM “if the armistice negotiations collapse the United States would probably make a stronger rather than lesser military exertion.” There has been no historical record to indicate that Dulles’s message was ever communicated to Moscow or Peking, however when an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 Dulles saw it as a great victory for the United States. Immerman notes:

From the Secretary of States point of view, a truce on U.S. terms was a victory… The Communists had backed down while the United States had remained resolute. Rather than compromise on its principles, it had flexed its military muscle.

Despite Dulles perceiving the armistice as a prominent success, Herring questions the impact of Dulles’s diplomatic actions in bringing about a truce. As he suggests, ‘the president and Dulles did maneuver skillfully among their Communist enemies’ however further claims:

The decisive event in the Korean settlement seems to have been Stalin’s death. Problems of succession and rising unrest in Eastern Europe compelled the new Soviet leaders to seek a breathing space through the relaxation of tensions.

“Brinkmanship” & “Massive Retaliation”:

On September 3, 1954, the Communist Peoples Republic of China issued the shelling of the offshore nationalist island of Quemoy. America having just completed its military venture in Korea and having been reluctant to intervene militarily in Indochina provided Mao Zedong with the confirmation that the U.S. was unlikely to respond by force to such actions. Dulles encouraged Eisenhower to overtly state that the U.S. was committed to the defense of Taiwan, however that Quemoy should not be specifically referred to, thereby if China should pursue a land invasion America would not been drawn into another war. When it became clear that Mao rejected any acknowledgement of Dulles’s bluff, Dulles in a meeting with Eisenhower on January 19 argued that America should make it position clearer. This ultimately resulted in the passage in Congress of the Formosa Resolution, which provided what Immerman calls Eisenhower with a ‘blank check to use U.S. force in the Taiwan Strait.’ In a desperate attempt to check the Chinese Communists resolve Dulles turned towards his nuclear strategy of “massive retaliation”, which he publicized in January 1954. The impact of the U.S. consideration of nuclear intervention had a detrimental effect on the Western friendship. Manderson-Jones instigates ‘with the development of nuclear power the traditional alliances between nations became weakened.’ He notes that allies felt subject to Washington due to its nuclear dominance. Further, Hoopes indicates that Dulles failed to recognize repercussions on the populace that would be affected by such a nuclear conquest.

Faced with the alarming reality of nuclear retaliation the PRC failed to sequester to the U.S. threat. In a final attempt to prove America’s resolve not to concede to Communist expansionism, on April 17 1955 Dulles, Admiral Radford and his brother Allen promoted a stratagem. The U.S. would construct a blockade around the PRC coastline of the Taiwan Strait and install nuclear armaments in Taiwan. On April 23 Premier Chou En-lai declared the termination of Chinese shelling. In a Life Magazine article published on January 16, 1956, Dulles illustrated his ‘most notorious policy’ of “brinkmanship.” He described it as “the ability to get on the verge of war without getting into the war.” He claimed victoriously that in Quemoy he successfully curbed the communist expansionist vendetta effectively instilling the fear of crossing the brink into open warfare. Goold-Adams penned, ‘it was one of the outstanding examples of successful Dullesian brinkmanship.’ The fact that Dulles was able to avoid entrenching America into conflict is a credit to his ability as a diplomatist. As Goold-Adams concludes:

He was in fact in an extremely tight corner, and to the unbiased observer he never showed more diplomatic skill or a finer sense of judgment than in his performance over the offshore islands.

“The Spirit of Geneva”:

On July 18, 1955, the first meeting between the four ‘great powers’ – United States, Britain, Russia and France, took place. Dulles had little patience to entertain the Communist powers. Despite recognizing a need for a meeting between the East and West he was pessimistic to regard the beneficial outcome of such. He wrote to Eisenhower advising him that he should attempt to downplay the medias attention to the conference by “avoiding social meetings where he will be photographed with Bulganin, Khrushchev, etc., and by maintaining an austere countenance on occasions where photographing together is inevitable.” Dulles illustrated his repulsion of Communism at the summit when he refused to be seated near any of the Communist delegates. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Eden’s private secretary, recalled Dulles as having his “mouth drawn down at the corners, and his eyes on the ceiling, sucking his teeth.” Khrushchev in his memoirs noted despite Geneva being important for East-West relations, he lamented the fact that there was no substantial outcome. He wrote, ‘The United States in those days refused to make even the most reasonable concessions because John Foster Dulles was still alive. It was he who determined the foreign policy of the United States, not President Eisenhower.’ Khrushchev deliberately invited his Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, to the conference due to their relationship during the world war. He reminisced:

We hoped that Eisenhower and Zhukov might have a chance to talk alone together and that they would exchange views about the need for peaceful coexistence. But the vicious cur Dulles was always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line. Dulles could not tolerate the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

While it is unlikely that any concrete outcome would have culminated from the meetings, Dulles’s inability to entertain the prospect of any serious notion of peace between the powers and his uncompromising personality particularly had a defective role on the summit. On the fourth day Eisenhower gave his “open skies” speech presenting the U.S. initiative to pursue peace, the Soviets responded in consensus. However Dulles indicated his skepticism when he stated in a press conference “I think it is a little premature to talk about the “era of good feelings”.” This is one illustration of how Dulles’ series of press conferences deterred international communications.

“Agonizing Reappraisals”:

A key objective inherited from the Truman administration was the formation of a European Defense Community. In May 1952 the six Benelux countries signed the EDC. However, it needed ratified by the parliaments of the signatories. Under pressure from congress to limit expenditure within national defense, it became a chief objective of Dulles to form a United States of Europe. From its very beginning Britain remained uncommitted to any supranational organization, claiming the preservation of its sovereignty. Ruane argues that the fact America failed to participate in the community initiated fears that if Britain was to join it would become merely another European country and the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ would be dissolved. Dulles held such ideas of a ‘special relationship’ with contempt and as a result friendships across the pond came under immense strain. Manderson-Jones states:

Nothing in fact was more irritating to Dulles than the British claim to a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and apart from sharing all the worst prejudices against British imperialism, Dulles had no understanding of and little concern for the Commonwealth, which he regarded as a vague instrument for maintaining Britain’s illusions of power.

Despite Dulles reluctant acceptance of British separatism, France created a major barrier to the EDC ratification. Emotions ascended by the idea of rearming Germany, the country that had invaded them twice. Dulles pursued a threatening policy in order to achieve EDC ratification. As early as January 1953 Dulles stated publicly if the EDC was not passed it would be necessary “to give a little rethinking to America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.” He remarked that the U.S. had spent $40 billion in the reconstruction of Western Europe and in exchange called for EDC ratification. Tudda argues ‘after this speech, the goodwill generated by the inaugural address evaporated overnight.’ In December 1953 Dulles maintained in a press conference that if France failed to approve the union it would “force from the United States an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policy.” The fear of U.S. withdrawal from Europe sent a wave of horror over the allies, Churchill remarked the “danger which I fear most is Mr. Dulles’ “agonized reappraisal”.’ Despite the pressure of American unilateralism on August 30, 1954 the French parliament voted against the alliance. The very anxiety that Dulles would stay true to his words led Eden to swiftly act to attract support for a pact integrating West Germany into NATO. Dulles was pessimistic of the Brussels pact, which exemplified the Anglo-American tensions. When Dulles went to Bonn prior to talks in London Eden believed he was attempting to sabotage the Western European Alliance. On October 3, the Brussels Pact was approved. The events of the crisis within European defense indicate that Dulles failed to understand the impact of his words on allied relations. The pursuit of an EDC strained the Anglo-American alliance. He failed to take into account the justification for France’s reluctance to join. Eisenhower remorsefully noted Dulles lacked “understanding as to how his words and manner may affect another personality.” Despite the rift in relations and the collapse of Dulles’s ultimate aim of EDC ratification Ruane argues:

What is sometimes overlooked in all the praise for Eden’s efforts is the degree to which his crisis management was framed in response to the possibility of American peripheral defense.

Ruane claims while Eden has been praised, specifically by British scholars, for responding swiftly to reach an alternative agreement, Dulles effectively played on the fears of Britain and the other allies in order motivate them to pass some sort of European alliance.

Suez Canal Crisis:

In May 1953 Dulles was anxious to conciliate the vacuum that the Middle East created for the West. After Egypt resisted the construction of a defense association Dulles set about defense arrangements in the “Northern Tier.” The Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955. Nasser perceived the pact as a means to undermine his leadership and sought increased armament. On September 27, 1955, agreements were reached with the Soviet Union for the supply of $200 million worth of arms from Czechoslovakia in exchange for cotton shares. The West saw this as a chance for Soviet influence to expand in the Middle East and when Nasser indicated plans to reconstruct the Aswan Canal the U.S. and Britain both saw it as a chance to secure Western leverage in Egypt. However, it became clear that with congressional restriction on finances and the fact that Egypt would not be able to balance debts incurred by the trade for armaments that Western aid would be unrealistic. Lloyd and Dulles were in consensus to allow the idea to “wither on the vine.” However, Dulles in a meeting with the Egyptian Ambassador provided a statement indicating that the U.S. would withdraw aid to the scheme. As a result Nasser reacted with insult and pronounced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Gould-Adams argues that Dulles contributed as one of the factors for the Suez Crisis. He notes, ‘he provoked Nasser in the first instance by the gratuitously insulting way in which he suddenly withdrew American money from the Aswan Canal.’ French reaction to the Suez crisis further backs this position as Richardson stated, ‘the French repeatedly reminded Dulles it was a direct consequence of the actions of the United States.’ Churchill noted, “Foster Dulles is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him.” This is another example of Dulles’ inability to recognize the consequence of his actions and undermine his allies. However, he was faced simultaneously with the fact of congressional restrictions.

The Suez Crisis emphasized the lack of communication between the allies and further the partisanship within the Atlantic Alliance. Britain and France wished to overthrow Nasser, while in Washington, despite their dislike of the Egyptian leader, believed it must remained aligned with Nasser in order to curb Russian influence. Richardson highlighted the distinct differences in political action, ‘Washington resolved to try to undo Nasser’s actions, London resolved to undo Nasser.’ In order to obtain an antidote to allies split in purpose a London Conference was held. The result was a majority agreement for an international management body to regulate the Canal. Dulles was initially the author of the plan. On August 28, as Goold-Adams notes ‘Dulles’s own extraordinary complex personality took over.’ Dulles in a press conference insisted that America and the allies were not aligned together within the Suez decision. Further, Eisenhower publicly stated, “we are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute – nothing else.” As a result the London Conference objectives had been undermined. Dulles further in an attempt to find a peaceful means for transits to pass through the canal construed the Suez Canal Users Association. The SCUA required a second London Conference. However, Dulles for the second time undermined allied influence in obtaining a compromise from Egypt in his press statement, “we do not intend to shoot our way through; we might have the right to do it, but the United States does not intend to do it. If we are met by force, we do not intend to get into a shooting war.” As a result the chance of Nasser accepting SCUA was diminished. Dulles’s inability to understand how his words effected the allied position had an immense impact on the advancement of conflict in the Suez region. As Eden lamented:

It would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause the maximum allied disunity and disarray… Such cynicism towards allies destroys true partnership. It leaves only the choice of parting or of a master and vassal relationship in foreign policy… American torpedoing of their own plan on the first day of launching it left no alternative but to use force or acquiesce in Nasser’s triumph.

The Suez crisis personified more than merely a difference in opinion as to how the fiasco should be dealt with, but a war of colonialism and nationalism between the Western allies. Eden confided with his private secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh that the U.S. was attempting to expand its resolute strength in replacing the French in Indochina and claiming, “they want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world.” Dulles personified the typical American anti-colonialist and as a result there became an immense suspicion between the U.S. and her colonial allies.

Louis in his assessment of the Suez Crisis argues that it has become generalized that Dulles was the villain. However, he challenges the internalized view by arguing that Eisenhower must accept a substantial amount of the blame. Louis notes:

He expected Dulles not only to oppose colonialism but also to support Britain and France as the oldest and most valued allies of the United States. Here was a challenge that tested even Dulles’s intellectual agility and tore him emotionally.

Revisionist historians in consensus with Louis claim that Eisenhower had strategically used Dulles within foreign policy in order to retract criticism from himself. Boyle claims that Dulles ‘acted as a lightening rod to attract criticism and allow Eisenhower to appear to be the genial, unifying head of state.’ During the events in the Middle East Dulles’s diplomacy tended to contradict itself, he sought to use the allies desire to use force to provide concessions from Nasser, while at the simultaneously he did not advocate the use of force. The paradox strained allied relations, as Richardson indicates:

Throughout the period Dulles was trying to play a very delicate game. On the one hand, he sought to use British belligerence and the Anglo-French military plans, in the belief that the threat of force might incline Nasser toward accommodation. On the other hand, he did not wish the British and French to believe he was endorsing their use of force. The equivocations that occurred from his position infuriated the Europeans, who complained that Dulles’s self-contradictions were tantamount to betrayal.

The revisionist analysis, however, fails to take into consideration the extent to which Dulles himself played within foreign policy decisions. During his period as Secretary of State Dulles traveled a record of 500,000 miles in his foreign diplomatic duties. As Hoopes claimed he was ‘…an impressive, headstrong man who was unquestionably the principal architect of foreign policy during the Eisenhower period.’

In late October Israeli forces pursued into Egypt and Britain and France issued an ultimatum that Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez come under their temporary control. Nasser ignored the Ultimatum and as result the allies commenced air raids on October 30. While the crisis unfolded in the Middle East, Dulles worked within the confines of the UN to bring an ultimate ceasefire on November 6. The conflict over the Suez Canal created a lasting contention between the Atlantic Alliance. Herring concluded:

The Suez affair was one of the most complex and dangerous of Cold War crises. Walking a tightrope over numerous conflicting forces, Eisenhower and Dulles did manage to avert war with the Soviet Union and limit the damage to relations with the Arab states. On the other hand, America’s relations with its major allies plunged to their lowest point in years.

Conclusion:

In evaluation, Dulles’ effectiveness as Secretary of State is an elect amalgam of both successes and failures. Dulles’ tenure in office was underlined by his staunch Presbyterianism. He perceived the conflicting ideologies between East and West as part of a moral battle against the satanic powers of Communism. Such ideas often overruled in his foreign policy decisions. An example is at the Geneva Convention were his uncompromising character was certainly a factor in the inability to reach any decisive results. Dulles failed to recognize the long-term consequences of his actions. As he rallied under the headings of “massive retaliation” and “brinkmanship” he lacked the ability to understand how the threat of nuclear intervention could affect both the communities in danger and the allied nations. While one must question, counterfactually, what would have been the outcome if America had been forced to go beyond the brink? Dulles made light of allied relations and his deep detest of colonialism often played a distinctive role in his policies. However, on the other hand Dulles must be commended for his effectiveness as a diplomat. As Secretary of State, a Congress that was dedicated to regulating defense spending contained Dulles in his policies. He also had to appease both the congressional right and left. Throughout the six years he had successfully avoided America entering another war and Khrushchev praised him as tactician who recognized the importance of never going beyond the brink. While commentators during the 1950s were keen to stereotypically label him as ineffective, as more information has been made available through Princeton’s archives, it is evident that Dulles cannot be dismissed into a label as a success or a failure. As a result Dulles’ impact as Secretary of State remains a controversial issue within historiography.

US History: The Roaring Twenties

INTRODUCTION

In 1928 President Herbert Hoover declared, "We in America today are nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land."  Historiography concerning America in the twenties is often overly simplistic and deceptive.  Popular terms of reference include the "the Golden Twenties", "the Asprin Age", "the Era of Excess" and "the New Era."  While many in the United States experienced higher living standards and were provided with more choices than ever before with a period of economic expansion and technological innovation, not everyone basked in the affluence of the decade.  Many Americans remained displaced within society such as immigrants, farmers, laboring classes and African-Americans.  As McCoy has instigated, 'The Prosperity of the 1920s did not spread to all the people, just as the depression of the 1930s  was not disasterous for all Americans.'

ECONOMIC PROGRESS

The Twenties introduced a boom within technological invention.  Technological innovations adopted by industries acted as a stimulus on the American economy, which consequently created a greater demand for labor.  Industries such as construction welcomed machinery including pneumatic tools, dump trucks, and belt and bucket conveyors.  In chemicals and synthetics you have the combining of materials to make bakelite and cellophane, and in the communication companies there were major breakthroughs with the introduction of automatic switchboards and dial phones.  With more efficient means of labor, real wages for factory workers climbed by thirteen per cent during the decade.  The number of white collar workers increased from 10.5 million to 14.3  million.  While wages climbed the number of hours per the working week fell from 47.6 hours to 42.1 hours, allowing Americans more time for recreational activities such as bowling, camping and visiting historical sites of interest.  Americans had more lifestyle choices than ever before.  The consumer goods industry flourished with the marketing of washing machines, vacuum cleaners and refrigerators - making the day to day household chores for the housewife easier.

Americans also had ambiguous means of entertainment.  By the close of 1922 there were 508 radio stations and three million Americans owned a radio.  Hollywood became cheap way for the working class to escape as images of self made men and pretty girls galvanized across the big screen.  Nickelodeons became aptly known because a ticket only cost a nickel.  By 1926 every large American city had a movie theater and by the end of the decade more than 20,000 cinemas were constructed.  In 1922 motion pictures sold some 40 million tickets per a week, by 1930 this soared to 100 million.  The talkies were also introduced during the twenties.  In 1929 Al Johnson's "The Jazz Singer" produced by Warner Brothers included three sound musical numbers.  Films subsidized for camp meetings as the dominant means by which people absorbed information with news reels.  The film houses became an important educational tool.

The nation became mobilized during the twenties.  In 1915 only 2.5 million automobiles were registered on American roads.  By 1920 this number relatively increased to 9.2 million.  However, by 1930 26.7 million vehicles were commuting around the nation.  There was one automobile for every five Americans, compared with say Britain were there was only one for every forty-three British citizens.  Theoretically it was possible in the twenties for every American citizen to be on the road at the same time.  Henry For produced an affordable car for the average person with his Model T.  The Model T in 1926 only cost $290.  Furthermore, Americans were now able to buy on credit.  In 1925 75 per cent of all automobile purchases were bought on installment plans.  Ford's assembly line created a more efficient means to manage industry.  By October 31, 1925, Ford was rolling a Model T off the assembly line every ten seconds.  The automobile industry also became a lifeline for other industries.  Automobiles absorbed twenty per cent of the nations steel, eighty per cent of its rubber and seventy-five per cent of its glass.  The automobile companies also helped setup new services such as roadside restaurants, motels, gas stations and garages.  The Construction business also benefited from automobiles.  Since more Americans now owned a set of wheels the vacuum between rural and urban America submerged and as a result more people moved to the suburbs.  Further, new highway systems were built.  Before the construction of new roads one would have to wait several days for dirt roads to dry from the rain before commuting to the next town in Iowa.  By 1928 one could travel from New York as far west as St. Mary's, Kansas on the new roads.  As Leuchtenburg instigates, "The production of automobiles soared almost at a geometric rate, and the industry gave a shot in the arm to the whole economy."





While many Americans prospered from this boom in economic opportunity, many did not.  The richest tenth of the population  received forty per cent of the national income.  In "sick" industries including coal and textiles workers saw nothing of this great prosperity.  Child labor continued throughout the decade with some two million children working in textile mills and cranberry fields.  Furthermore, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found in 1929 that in order to have a "descent standard of living" a family of two adults and two children had to earn around $2,500.  However, during 1929 of the twenty-seven million people who filed income tax returns, twelve million earned $1,500 or less.

"THE NEW WOMAN"


F. Scott Fitzgerald coined the decade "The Jazz Age."  Young people were believed to be more permissive towards sex and recreation and the "New Woman" and the "Flapper" presented a clear rebellion against Victorian ideals.  The Flapper was more masculine in her conduct and appearance - flat chested, drinking, smoking and swearing.  Views on marriage changed during the decade.  During the pre-1918 era it was generally an internalized norm that me would be the head of the family and be responsible for the provision and protection of the wife and kin, while women were restricted to roles within the domestic sphere such as cooking and cleaning.  By 1930, marriage was based on exalted codes honoring romantic love.  While in 1914 divorce rate was steady at 100,000 by 1929 this had more than doubled to 205,000.  Women also obtained employment.  While in 1900 only 86,000 women held positions as secretaries by 1930 this had climbed to 775,000 women in clerical roles.  Women flew airplanes and drove taxis and by the end of the decade around ten million women had a job outside the home.

One of the most contentious issues for women in the 1920s was birth control.  A New York nurse, Margret Sanger became synonymous with birth control in America.  In 1912 Sanger distributed literature among working class women promoting contraception.  Sanger published "The Woman Rebel" in 1914 that publicized feminist ideals and in 1916 she established America's first family planning clinic in Brooklyn.  In 1921 the American Birth Control League was formed.  As a result of Sanger's efforts by 1936 American doctors were legally prescribing contraception.  Women had more of a voice in how many children they wanted.  However, to suggest that all or a disproportionate segment of American women embraced new cultural trends would be an oversight.  Many women remained in traditional roles within the home.  Further, while women did gain the right to vote during the period many women either neglected the right or voted in alignment with their husbands.  Women were discriminated by employers and were often contained to what was deemed as "women's jobs."  Harvard failed to admit women into its medical or law schools.  As William H. Chafe wrote:

"If the word 'emancipation' is take to mean the ability of women to function in the world outside the home on the same basis as men.  Then female workers remained as unemancipated in the 1920s as in the 1940s."

IMMIGRATION

During the war the number of immigrants entering the U.S. stagnated.  However, after the war a "new wave" of immigrants flocked through the great hall at Ellis Island.  Between June 1920 and June 1921 approximately 800,000 immigrants came to America.  During the early twenties half of all white men and a third of all white women in the manufacturing industry were foreign born.  Nearly a third of Chicago's 2.7 million residents in the twenties were from alien lands.  The new immigrants looked and spoke differently bringing their cultural traditions and home country's dialect with them.  New Yorkers spoke in thirty-seven different languages.  Lingering from wartime, anti-foreign sentiment swept across the nation accelerated by "Pro-American" reactionary movements such as the Ku Klux Klan which came to national prominence during the twenties.  Nativist ideals and xenophobic attitudes gave rise to congressional legislation to place a cap on immigration, laws which would last until the 1960s.  In June 1921 Congress passed the Emergency Immigration Act which restricted the number of new arrivals annually to three per cent of the population.  In 1924 even more restrictive code was enacted with the Johnson-Reed Act which placed a ceiling of new comers to 150,000 a year.  The Johnson-Reed Act was more favorable to persons from Ireland, England, Germany and Scandinavia at the expense of those from Eastern and Southern Europe and Asia.  The law claimed it was preserving the anglo-saxon values of the nordic and teutonic races.  Consequently many families were unable to be reunited in the New World.   Unable to obtain assistance from the government, immigrants found shelter in the ghettos of cities such as New York and Chicago creating their own little worlds such as Little Italy and Little Poland.  As David Kennedy notes, "Many immigrants wondered if the fabled promises of American life was a vagrant and perhaps impossible dream."

AGRICULTURE


During World War I farmers experienced an agricultural boom.  The war had induced a greater demand for food surplus.  Raw farm prices increased by almost eighty-two per cent between 1913 and 1917.  Farmers net incomes more than doubled from $4 billion to $10 billion and the number of farmers earning at least $2000 increased from 140,000 to 1,800,000.  Yet by the 1920s the demand for farming produce subsided.  The U.S. government and allies no longer demanded huge quantities of food and farming prices fell dramatically.  Prices of wheat fell from $2.50 per a bushel to a dollar and the prices of corn declined by seventy-five per cent.  By 1922 the agricultural market in Europe had recovered from the war and was no longer dependent on American produce.  With the passage of the 18th amendment and the enactment of the Volstead Act prohibition had dried farmers of one their its most loyal customers, the distilleries and breweries.  With technologically more efficient machinery such as tractors, farmers suffered from overproduction.  While Congress approved twice the McNary-Haugen Bill, which proposed that the federal government should act as the buyer of last resort of farm surplus, President Calvin Coolidge used his prerogative and vetoed the bill.  Therefore for farmers the twenties had meant the death nail on their abundance of prosperity with little help from Washington.

AFRICAN-AMERICANS


During the war some 500,000 African-Americans trekked North, leaving their rural heartland behind, in sight of new economic opportunities.  During the 1920s another million African-Americans would make the journey.  This "Great Migration" of African-American's to the northern cities transplanted an essentially rural, deeply religious and uneducated populace into the industrial advancements of the North.    They sought economic prosperity and release from the stringent racial Jim Crow laws restricting them in every part of southern society.  However, those who made the trip were disappointed.  Life in the North was no easier.  African-Americans encountered the similar partition of public facilities along racial lines and their dream of economic affluence was largely thwarted by the ensuing economic depression.  Once more the mass migration had uprooted men and women from kinship networks and institutions which had acted as a solace and emotional release from their inward discontentment toward racial discrimination.  As E. Franklin Frazier argues:

"In the cold impersonal environment of the city, the institutions and associations which had provided security and support for the Negro in the rural environment could not be resurrected... The most important crisis in the life of the Negro migrant was produced by the absence of the church which had been the centre of his social life and a refuge from a hostile world."

Many African-Americans remained in the Jim Crow South.  In 1930 four out of five Americans lived in the rural South.  Further, African-Americans lacked representation in both local and federal government. Up until the late 1940s only five per cent of African-Americans were registered to vote in the eleven former confederate states.  African-Americans also suffered a lower life expectancy to whites and by 1930 infant mortality rates were nearly double that of whites.


CONCLUSION


"The Roaring Twenties" did give rise to the sound of contentment and happiness from the entire nation.  While America saw a time of relative abundance with technological inventiveness boosting the economy and providing employment for millions such as the automobiles companies and construction, other areas of the economy suffered.  The demand for coal fell with the introduction of electrical machinery and appliances.  Women gained a more pronounced role within society outside the home with employment, voting rights, birth control, feminist ideals and a transformation views toward marriage.  However, many women had little time for these new trends and held onto their traditional roles in society.  Minority groups such as African-Americans and immigrants failed to be integrated into American society, displaced by racial segregation and ethnocentric attitudes.  Therefore, "The Roaring Twenties" did roar but not as loudly as it is believed it did.  Not all Americans shared in a slice of the apple pie.  As Parrish concluded:

"...the vaunted prosperity of the decade fell to some more than others and did not touch the lives of millions.  Radiant statistics about per capita income and wage growth cloaked numerous cases of economic catastrophe..."

Uncertainty for Palin 2012 Nomination

In an interview with CNN's Larry King, former first lady Barbara Bush was blunt on her views of the uncertain presidential nominee for the 2012 general election Sarah Palin.  In the Interview broadcast aired tonight Mrs. Bush when asked by King "what's your read about Sarah Palin?" elegantly stated "I sat next to her once, thought she was beautiful, and I think she's very happy in Alaska", cuttingly adding, "and I hope she'll stay there."  

This is not the first time Palin has been denounced for the presidency by a predominant GOP figure.  One Republican heavyweight remarked, "We believe she could get the nomination, but Barack Obama would crush her."  Further a Politico Report has highlighted that a number of Republican Party members perceive her to be a liability to the party, particularly in relation to her running in the 2012 campaign.  An interview with CBS News on October 26 with John McCain suggests that he feels uneasy in endorsing for the presidency his former running mate during the 2008 campaign.  

Despite recent turbulence within President Obama's administration, having lost the House to his Republican colleagues, there are some suggestions that Obama may serve a second term.  A new National Poll found that if Palin were to run as his opposition in 2012 he would hypothetically beat her by 8 percentage points.  However, the poll results also indicate that the majority of Americans do not believe he deserves a second term in office.  At present Palin is not looking so attractive for the GOPs nomination.  While she may have been an effective figure in rallying support during the midterms, statistics suggest that if Palin does run she maybe the Achilles heel for the GOP’s opportunity to retake the White House.  After all the memory of her blunders in 2008 will still be fresh on voters’ minds.  As a recent ABC News Poll found, only 27 percent believed she is qualified to be the next president.