John Foster Dulles: Effective Secretary of State?

Introduction:

John Foster Dulles during his tenure as Secretary of State from 1953 – 1959 brought with him the experience and ability of an effective diplomat within foreign affairs. He was the grandson and nephew of two former secretaries of state. However, his intellect was often undermined by his own personality and in many ways he was a victim of the time. By considering a number of his foreign policy decisions such as Geneva, Korea, the formation of a European Defense unit, and the Suez Canal Crisis it is evident he clearly lived up to the mark that the New York Times knighted him with as a ‘great negotiator.’ However, unfortunately for Dulles his personality defects of a Presbyterian background, his inability to comprehend a new post-Stalin world order, his regular speeches and press conferences and lack of understanding for the consequences of his actions tarnished his credibility and consequently has undermined his legacy.

Stalin’s Death: the Prospect of Détente?

Weeks after President Eisenhower took the oath of office he faced his first major challenge within the international arena. On March 4, 1953 Joseph Stalin died and with it brought the appearance of a new Soviet leadership. Georgi Malenkov called on the Western world for a new order of “peaceful co-existence and competition.” The question was open whether an opportunity had arisen to defrost Cold War tensions. Winston Churchill welcomed the idea of relaxing tensions and called for a summit between the world powers. On April 16, 1953 Eisenhower went before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and made his renowned ‘Chance for Peace Speech.’ Isaacs and Downing claim ‘he appeared to be holding out an olive branch hoping the Kremlin would grab it.’ Two days later Foster Dulles went before the same audience of editors arguing “we are not dancing to any Russian tune.” As a result Leffler notes ‘Dulles’s address seemed belligerent and insulting, and had wrongly stated the Soviet leaders were responding to U.S. strength.’ Gardner surmised, ‘if Eisenhower’s language opened the road to negotiations (an arguable proposition), Dulles put a gate across the path two days later.’

Dulles claimed that the Soviet Union could not be trusted and that “vast power is possessed by men who accept no guidance from the moral law.” The secretary of state was uncompromising in his rhetoric to what perhaps could have been a prospect of peace. Kirby notes:

Dulles behaved as though the Cold War was a morality play in which he was acting the part of an old style preacher. He insisted the Soviet Union was an evil and an untrustworthy nation with which America and its allies should have no dealings.

Hoopes in consensus argues that for the new secretary the world was in a spiritual war on one side of the battlefield lay Christianity and the other Communism. This overall belief dictated his actions within foreign policy and further strained his relationship with his international counterparts. As Goold-Adams surmised, ‘Dulles had thought so much about Communism before coming to power that inevitably he did not find it easy to change his main conclusions after Stalin died.’ As a result his stringent ideals defected his effectiveness as a Secretary of State in a Post-Stalin era.

Korean Armistice:

Concluding the Korean conflict became an imperative objective of the new administration. Korea had become a financial burden on United States defense. In the last three years of the Truman administration defense spending escalated from $13.5 billion to over $50 billion. It therefore became a key aim to conclude the war, however negotiations came to a halt each time over the conditions to which POWs should be repatriated. Eisenhower decided to play on the threat of nuclear defense if the Chinese would not concede over the terms for an armistice. The conflict would expand to Mainland China and include the use of nuclear weaponry unless China accepted the proposals. Dulles took advantage of a diplomatic trip to India to meet with Prime Minister Nehru. Dulles mentioned to the PM “if the armistice negotiations collapse the United States would probably make a stronger rather than lesser military exertion.” There has been no historical record to indicate that Dulles’s message was ever communicated to Moscow or Peking, however when an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 Dulles saw it as a great victory for the United States. Immerman notes:

From the Secretary of States point of view, a truce on U.S. terms was a victory… The Communists had backed down while the United States had remained resolute. Rather than compromise on its principles, it had flexed its military muscle.

Despite Dulles perceiving the armistice as a prominent success, Herring questions the impact of Dulles’s diplomatic actions in bringing about a truce. As he suggests, ‘the president and Dulles did maneuver skillfully among their Communist enemies’ however further claims:

The decisive event in the Korean settlement seems to have been Stalin’s death. Problems of succession and rising unrest in Eastern Europe compelled the new Soviet leaders to seek a breathing space through the relaxation of tensions.

“Brinkmanship” & “Massive Retaliation”:

On September 3, 1954, the Communist Peoples Republic of China issued the shelling of the offshore nationalist island of Quemoy. America having just completed its military venture in Korea and having been reluctant to intervene militarily in Indochina provided Mao Zedong with the confirmation that the U.S. was unlikely to respond by force to such actions. Dulles encouraged Eisenhower to overtly state that the U.S. was committed to the defense of Taiwan, however that Quemoy should not be specifically referred to, thereby if China should pursue a land invasion America would not been drawn into another war. When it became clear that Mao rejected any acknowledgement of Dulles’s bluff, Dulles in a meeting with Eisenhower on January 19 argued that America should make it position clearer. This ultimately resulted in the passage in Congress of the Formosa Resolution, which provided what Immerman calls Eisenhower with a ‘blank check to use U.S. force in the Taiwan Strait.’ In a desperate attempt to check the Chinese Communists resolve Dulles turned towards his nuclear strategy of “massive retaliation”, which he publicized in January 1954. The impact of the U.S. consideration of nuclear intervention had a detrimental effect on the Western friendship. Manderson-Jones instigates ‘with the development of nuclear power the traditional alliances between nations became weakened.’ He notes that allies felt subject to Washington due to its nuclear dominance. Further, Hoopes indicates that Dulles failed to recognize repercussions on the populace that would be affected by such a nuclear conquest.

Faced with the alarming reality of nuclear retaliation the PRC failed to sequester to the U.S. threat. In a final attempt to prove America’s resolve not to concede to Communist expansionism, on April 17 1955 Dulles, Admiral Radford and his brother Allen promoted a stratagem. The U.S. would construct a blockade around the PRC coastline of the Taiwan Strait and install nuclear armaments in Taiwan. On April 23 Premier Chou En-lai declared the termination of Chinese shelling. In a Life Magazine article published on January 16, 1956, Dulles illustrated his ‘most notorious policy’ of “brinkmanship.” He described it as “the ability to get on the verge of war without getting into the war.” He claimed victoriously that in Quemoy he successfully curbed the communist expansionist vendetta effectively instilling the fear of crossing the brink into open warfare. Goold-Adams penned, ‘it was one of the outstanding examples of successful Dullesian brinkmanship.’ The fact that Dulles was able to avoid entrenching America into conflict is a credit to his ability as a diplomatist. As Goold-Adams concludes:

He was in fact in an extremely tight corner, and to the unbiased observer he never showed more diplomatic skill or a finer sense of judgment than in his performance over the offshore islands.

“The Spirit of Geneva”:

On July 18, 1955, the first meeting between the four ‘great powers’ – United States, Britain, Russia and France, took place. Dulles had little patience to entertain the Communist powers. Despite recognizing a need for a meeting between the East and West he was pessimistic to regard the beneficial outcome of such. He wrote to Eisenhower advising him that he should attempt to downplay the medias attention to the conference by “avoiding social meetings where he will be photographed with Bulganin, Khrushchev, etc., and by maintaining an austere countenance on occasions where photographing together is inevitable.” Dulles illustrated his repulsion of Communism at the summit when he refused to be seated near any of the Communist delegates. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Eden’s private secretary, recalled Dulles as having his “mouth drawn down at the corners, and his eyes on the ceiling, sucking his teeth.” Khrushchev in his memoirs noted despite Geneva being important for East-West relations, he lamented the fact that there was no substantial outcome. He wrote, ‘The United States in those days refused to make even the most reasonable concessions because John Foster Dulles was still alive. It was he who determined the foreign policy of the United States, not President Eisenhower.’ Khrushchev deliberately invited his Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, to the conference due to their relationship during the world war. He reminisced:

We hoped that Eisenhower and Zhukov might have a chance to talk alone together and that they would exchange views about the need for peaceful coexistence. But the vicious cur Dulles was always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line. Dulles could not tolerate the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

While it is unlikely that any concrete outcome would have culminated from the meetings, Dulles’s inability to entertain the prospect of any serious notion of peace between the powers and his uncompromising personality particularly had a defective role on the summit. On the fourth day Eisenhower gave his “open skies” speech presenting the U.S. initiative to pursue peace, the Soviets responded in consensus. However Dulles indicated his skepticism when he stated in a press conference “I think it is a little premature to talk about the “era of good feelings”.” This is one illustration of how Dulles’ series of press conferences deterred international communications.

“Agonizing Reappraisals”:

A key objective inherited from the Truman administration was the formation of a European Defense Community. In May 1952 the six Benelux countries signed the EDC. However, it needed ratified by the parliaments of the signatories. Under pressure from congress to limit expenditure within national defense, it became a chief objective of Dulles to form a United States of Europe. From its very beginning Britain remained uncommitted to any supranational organization, claiming the preservation of its sovereignty. Ruane argues that the fact America failed to participate in the community initiated fears that if Britain was to join it would become merely another European country and the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ would be dissolved. Dulles held such ideas of a ‘special relationship’ with contempt and as a result friendships across the pond came under immense strain. Manderson-Jones states:

Nothing in fact was more irritating to Dulles than the British claim to a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and apart from sharing all the worst prejudices against British imperialism, Dulles had no understanding of and little concern for the Commonwealth, which he regarded as a vague instrument for maintaining Britain’s illusions of power.

Despite Dulles reluctant acceptance of British separatism, France created a major barrier to the EDC ratification. Emotions ascended by the idea of rearming Germany, the country that had invaded them twice. Dulles pursued a threatening policy in order to achieve EDC ratification. As early as January 1953 Dulles stated publicly if the EDC was not passed it would be necessary “to give a little rethinking to America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.” He remarked that the U.S. had spent $40 billion in the reconstruction of Western Europe and in exchange called for EDC ratification. Tudda argues ‘after this speech, the goodwill generated by the inaugural address evaporated overnight.’ In December 1953 Dulles maintained in a press conference that if France failed to approve the union it would “force from the United States an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policy.” The fear of U.S. withdrawal from Europe sent a wave of horror over the allies, Churchill remarked the “danger which I fear most is Mr. Dulles’ “agonized reappraisal”.’ Despite the pressure of American unilateralism on August 30, 1954 the French parliament voted against the alliance. The very anxiety that Dulles would stay true to his words led Eden to swiftly act to attract support for a pact integrating West Germany into NATO. Dulles was pessimistic of the Brussels pact, which exemplified the Anglo-American tensions. When Dulles went to Bonn prior to talks in London Eden believed he was attempting to sabotage the Western European Alliance. On October 3, the Brussels Pact was approved. The events of the crisis within European defense indicate that Dulles failed to understand the impact of his words on allied relations. The pursuit of an EDC strained the Anglo-American alliance. He failed to take into account the justification for France’s reluctance to join. Eisenhower remorsefully noted Dulles lacked “understanding as to how his words and manner may affect another personality.” Despite the rift in relations and the collapse of Dulles’s ultimate aim of EDC ratification Ruane argues:

What is sometimes overlooked in all the praise for Eden’s efforts is the degree to which his crisis management was framed in response to the possibility of American peripheral defense.

Ruane claims while Eden has been praised, specifically by British scholars, for responding swiftly to reach an alternative agreement, Dulles effectively played on the fears of Britain and the other allies in order motivate them to pass some sort of European alliance.

Suez Canal Crisis:

In May 1953 Dulles was anxious to conciliate the vacuum that the Middle East created for the West. After Egypt resisted the construction of a defense association Dulles set about defense arrangements in the “Northern Tier.” The Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955. Nasser perceived the pact as a means to undermine his leadership and sought increased armament. On September 27, 1955, agreements were reached with the Soviet Union for the supply of $200 million worth of arms from Czechoslovakia in exchange for cotton shares. The West saw this as a chance for Soviet influence to expand in the Middle East and when Nasser indicated plans to reconstruct the Aswan Canal the U.S. and Britain both saw it as a chance to secure Western leverage in Egypt. However, it became clear that with congressional restriction on finances and the fact that Egypt would not be able to balance debts incurred by the trade for armaments that Western aid would be unrealistic. Lloyd and Dulles were in consensus to allow the idea to “wither on the vine.” However, Dulles in a meeting with the Egyptian Ambassador provided a statement indicating that the U.S. would withdraw aid to the scheme. As a result Nasser reacted with insult and pronounced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Gould-Adams argues that Dulles contributed as one of the factors for the Suez Crisis. He notes, ‘he provoked Nasser in the first instance by the gratuitously insulting way in which he suddenly withdrew American money from the Aswan Canal.’ French reaction to the Suez crisis further backs this position as Richardson stated, ‘the French repeatedly reminded Dulles it was a direct consequence of the actions of the United States.’ Churchill noted, “Foster Dulles is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him.” This is another example of Dulles’ inability to recognize the consequence of his actions and undermine his allies. However, he was faced simultaneously with the fact of congressional restrictions.

The Suez Crisis emphasized the lack of communication between the allies and further the partisanship within the Atlantic Alliance. Britain and France wished to overthrow Nasser, while in Washington, despite their dislike of the Egyptian leader, believed it must remained aligned with Nasser in order to curb Russian influence. Richardson highlighted the distinct differences in political action, ‘Washington resolved to try to undo Nasser’s actions, London resolved to undo Nasser.’ In order to obtain an antidote to allies split in purpose a London Conference was held. The result was a majority agreement for an international management body to regulate the Canal. Dulles was initially the author of the plan. On August 28, as Goold-Adams notes ‘Dulles’s own extraordinary complex personality took over.’ Dulles in a press conference insisted that America and the allies were not aligned together within the Suez decision. Further, Eisenhower publicly stated, “we are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute – nothing else.” As a result the London Conference objectives had been undermined. Dulles further in an attempt to find a peaceful means for transits to pass through the canal construed the Suez Canal Users Association. The SCUA required a second London Conference. However, Dulles for the second time undermined allied influence in obtaining a compromise from Egypt in his press statement, “we do not intend to shoot our way through; we might have the right to do it, but the United States does not intend to do it. If we are met by force, we do not intend to get into a shooting war.” As a result the chance of Nasser accepting SCUA was diminished. Dulles’s inability to understand how his words effected the allied position had an immense impact on the advancement of conflict in the Suez region. As Eden lamented:

It would be hard to imagine a statement more likely to cause the maximum allied disunity and disarray… Such cynicism towards allies destroys true partnership. It leaves only the choice of parting or of a master and vassal relationship in foreign policy… American torpedoing of their own plan on the first day of launching it left no alternative but to use force or acquiesce in Nasser’s triumph.

The Suez crisis personified more than merely a difference in opinion as to how the fiasco should be dealt with, but a war of colonialism and nationalism between the Western allies. Eden confided with his private secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh that the U.S. was attempting to expand its resolute strength in replacing the French in Indochina and claiming, “they want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world.” Dulles personified the typical American anti-colonialist and as a result there became an immense suspicion between the U.S. and her colonial allies.

Louis in his assessment of the Suez Crisis argues that it has become generalized that Dulles was the villain. However, he challenges the internalized view by arguing that Eisenhower must accept a substantial amount of the blame. Louis notes:

He expected Dulles not only to oppose colonialism but also to support Britain and France as the oldest and most valued allies of the United States. Here was a challenge that tested even Dulles’s intellectual agility and tore him emotionally.

Revisionist historians in consensus with Louis claim that Eisenhower had strategically used Dulles within foreign policy in order to retract criticism from himself. Boyle claims that Dulles ‘acted as a lightening rod to attract criticism and allow Eisenhower to appear to be the genial, unifying head of state.’ During the events in the Middle East Dulles’s diplomacy tended to contradict itself, he sought to use the allies desire to use force to provide concessions from Nasser, while at the simultaneously he did not advocate the use of force. The paradox strained allied relations, as Richardson indicates:

Throughout the period Dulles was trying to play a very delicate game. On the one hand, he sought to use British belligerence and the Anglo-French military plans, in the belief that the threat of force might incline Nasser toward accommodation. On the other hand, he did not wish the British and French to believe he was endorsing their use of force. The equivocations that occurred from his position infuriated the Europeans, who complained that Dulles’s self-contradictions were tantamount to betrayal.

The revisionist analysis, however, fails to take into consideration the extent to which Dulles himself played within foreign policy decisions. During his period as Secretary of State Dulles traveled a record of 500,000 miles in his foreign diplomatic duties. As Hoopes claimed he was ‘…an impressive, headstrong man who was unquestionably the principal architect of foreign policy during the Eisenhower period.’

In late October Israeli forces pursued into Egypt and Britain and France issued an ultimatum that Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez come under their temporary control. Nasser ignored the Ultimatum and as result the allies commenced air raids on October 30. While the crisis unfolded in the Middle East, Dulles worked within the confines of the UN to bring an ultimate ceasefire on November 6. The conflict over the Suez Canal created a lasting contention between the Atlantic Alliance. Herring concluded:

The Suez affair was one of the most complex and dangerous of Cold War crises. Walking a tightrope over numerous conflicting forces, Eisenhower and Dulles did manage to avert war with the Soviet Union and limit the damage to relations with the Arab states. On the other hand, America’s relations with its major allies plunged to their lowest point in years.

Conclusion:

In evaluation, Dulles’ effectiveness as Secretary of State is an elect amalgam of both successes and failures. Dulles’ tenure in office was underlined by his staunch Presbyterianism. He perceived the conflicting ideologies between East and West as part of a moral battle against the satanic powers of Communism. Such ideas often overruled in his foreign policy decisions. An example is at the Geneva Convention were his uncompromising character was certainly a factor in the inability to reach any decisive results. Dulles failed to recognize the long-term consequences of his actions. As he rallied under the headings of “massive retaliation” and “brinkmanship” he lacked the ability to understand how the threat of nuclear intervention could affect both the communities in danger and the allied nations. While one must question, counterfactually, what would have been the outcome if America had been forced to go beyond the brink? Dulles made light of allied relations and his deep detest of colonialism often played a distinctive role in his policies. However, on the other hand Dulles must be commended for his effectiveness as a diplomat. As Secretary of State, a Congress that was dedicated to regulating defense spending contained Dulles in his policies. He also had to appease both the congressional right and left. Throughout the six years he had successfully avoided America entering another war and Khrushchev praised him as tactician who recognized the importance of never going beyond the brink. While commentators during the 1950s were keen to stereotypically label him as ineffective, as more information has been made available through Princeton’s archives, it is evident that Dulles cannot be dismissed into a label as a success or a failure. As a result Dulles’ impact as Secretary of State remains a controversial issue within historiography.